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What are the causes and consequences of human development? In the twenty years since the 
publication of the first Human Development Report (HDR), political scientists have invested a 
great deal of time and effort into answering this question. So what do we know? In this paper we 
seek to review these labors, the fruits of which can be summarized as follows. Democracy 
causes, but is not caused by, economic development. While total economic growth is no higher 
as a result of democratic institutions, they are more conducive than non-democratic alternatives 
to the growth of per capita income, which is an important aspect of individual well-being. 
Democratic institutions are also conducive to improvements in the two other essential elements 
of human development, longevity and knowledge - democracy has a positive effect on indicators 
of education and health. Given these findings, it seems pertinent to ask why democracy has such 
effects. Our conclusion from the literature is that the positive impact of democratic institutions 
stems from their provision of accountability structures. But in providing these structures, what 
democracy offers is the opportunity for human development. It is no guarantee of its realization, 
and in the absence of factors such as information and participation this opportunity can be 
missed. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 Introduction
What are the causes and consequences of human development? In the twenty years since the ﬁrst
HumanDevelopmentReport(HDR)waspublishedin1990, politicalscientistshaveputagreatdeal
of time and effort towards answering this question. So what do we know? This paper’s purpose is
to review these labors, the fruits of which can be summarized as follows. Democracy causes, but
is not caused by, economic development. While total economic growth is no higher as a result of
democratic institutions, they are more conducive to the growth of per capita income, which is an
important aspect of individual well-being. Democracy is also conducive to improvements in the
two other essential elements of human development, longevity and knowledge; democracy has a
positive effect on indicators of education and health. The positive impact of democratic institutions
stems from their provision of accountability structures. But in providing these structures, what
democracy offers is the opportunity for human development. It is no guarantee of its realization,
and in the absence of factors such as information and participation this opportunity can be missed.
Stated as concisely as this, these conclusions seem ﬂippant. However, this appearance recedes on
consideration of the efforts upon which they are grounded, and which this paper attempts to review.
Following the division of labor within the literature, we focus ﬁrst on factors affecting economic
growth, before turning to the other elements of human development, education and health. For
each, we consider both the theoretical and the empirical claims that have been made. Before doing
so however, we take a moment to consider the concept of human development.
2 What is Human Development?
Since the launch of the ﬁrst HDR by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990,
it has been widely accepted that human development is about more than just economic factors. Of
1course, income is important. But as the pioneering HDR recognized,“income is not the sum total of
human life” (UNDP 1990: 9). Instead, the report conceived of human development as being a pro-
cessofenlargingpeople’schoices, mostessentiallybyallowingthemtoleadlongandhealthylives,
to acquire knowledge, and to have access to the resources necessary for a decent standard of living.
Moreover, it recognized that the development process consists not just of the formation of these
capabilities, for example through improved health, knowledge, and skills, but also of the use that
people make of them to improve the quality of their lives. Therefore in the words of Amartya Sen,
it posited that human development is about, “advancing the richness of human life, rather than the
richness of the economy in which human beings live” (http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/origins/).
By broadening the focus of development beyond the narrow economic means in order to recognize
the human ends, the HDR highlighted three essential elements of human life - longevity, knowl-
edge, and decent living standards. In so doing, it made clear that evaluating human development
requires more than simply a measure of income, because this is only an indicator of the third el-
ement (standard of living), and a fairly crude one at that. Rather, measures of income need to be
complemented with indicators of the other two elements, thus bringing into focus factors such as
life expectancy, health, literacy, and educational attainment. If human development is a process,
all of these factors and more are symptomatic of its progression. Fortunately, recognition of this
fact has grown steadily since the UNDP’s groundbreaking report was published in 1990. Twenty
years on, it is timely to consider what we have learnt as a result: what do we know about the causes
and consequences of human development, so conceived? And, more speciﬁcally, what conclusions
can be drawn about the role that institutional and structural factors play in human development? In
reviewing the political economy of human development this paper seeks to provide some answers.
Despite the recognition that human development has multiple components, however, a dispro-
portionate amount of scholarly work has ignored what we might think of as the more “human”
indicators of human development. Instead it has focused on income and economic growth, and
2in particular on their relationship with formal political institutions, most notably regime type. In
so doing, this body of work has produced a number of very important theoretical and empiri-
cal insights. While these shall be reviewed in detail in section 3, two signiﬁcant conclusions are
worth summarizing here. First, despite the appeal of modernization theory, the weight of evidence
suggests that economic development does not cause democracy. Second, democracy promotes
economic development. This is not to say that democratic institutions are an economic panacea;
the formal institutions of democracy encourage certain aspects of economic development and un-
dermine others, and these effects vary across different types of democratic institutions. But the
aggregate effect of democracy on per capita income is positive, and thus we can begin to con-
clude that democracy promotes human development. However, as was made clear by the words
of Amartya Sen, this view of human development is a limited one. If our interest is in human
development as the HDR more fully conceived it, we need to focus on all the factors that affect
“the richness of human life”.
Although economic growth has attracted the lion’s share of academic interest, other indicators
of human development have not been completely forgotten. For example, excellent theoretical
work has considered the effect of political institutions on the provision of public goods and the
development of human capital, and empirical studies have sought to investigate the determinants
of longevity and literacy. In so doing, these and other similar studies suggest quite conclusively
that democratic institutions have a positive impact on human development. That these conclusions
remain suggestive is likely due in part to variation in the types of democratic institutions found
around the world. Perhaps more importantly though, a number of studies have also highlighted
the importance of non-institutional variation among the world’s democracies, such as that which
results from differences in the nature of political competition, and in the availability of information
(factors which are also likely to be interconnected), all of which will be reviewed in section 5.
For now, itshould sufﬁceto notea simpleyet crucialtake-home point. When itcomes topromoting
3human development, democracy is good, but not all democracies are equally good. With this
in mind, we can suggest a possible preemptive conclusion: democratic institutions provide the
opportunities for human development, but these opportunities may be missed. This conclusion
leaves us with the clear goal of discovering how to unlock democracy’s potential. While such a
discovery is well beyond the grasp of this paper, we will try to highlight some implications from
the literature, which might point us in the right direction.
3 The Political Economy of Human (Economic) Development:
Living Standards
As noted above, a signiﬁcant proportion of the literature on the political economy of development
focuses on the economic aspect, considering factors that determine income or economic growth.
Moreover, there is something of a bias in this literature towards formal political institutions; the
question most frequently asked is whether democratic political institutions are more favorable to
economic growth than the dictatorial alternatives. Indeed, this question has sustained a veritable
industry within political science, and may almost be viewed as an entire sub-ﬁeld in itself. In
recent years a great deal of effort has been put to the purpose of empirically investigating this
relationship, but before discussing the fruits of these labors it is worth taking a moment to consider
their theoretical foundations. Why should we expect there to be a relationship between democracy
and economic development, in either direction?
43.1 Theories
The starting point for much of the thinking about how democracy and economic development are
related was Seymour Martin Lipset’s famous 1959 essay “Some Social Requisites of Democracy:
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” (Lipset (1959)). As the foundation of what
has become widely known as modernization theory, Lipset conjectured that there exists a positive
relationship between democracy and economic development, claiming that, “The more well-to-do
a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960: 31). After Lipset
set the ball rolling, modernization theorists took it up with abandon, enthusiastically pushing the
claim that economic development increases the likelihood of democracy.
This reasoning was based on various hypotheses concerning the effects of economic development.
Simply stated, it was argued that economic development leads to a moderation of processes of
political conﬂict, by: (1) giving rise to a democratic culture, in part as a result of increases in
education levels; (2) reducing the intensity of struggles between socioeconomic classes, follow-
ing a rise in the income and economic security of the masses; and (3) decreasing the premium on
political power by reducing the costs of redistribution (Lipset 1960: 39-52). In addition to these
changes in socioeconomic structures, it was also argued that economic development leads to the
emergence and proliferation of civil society organizations, which undermine the effectiveness of
dictatorial forms of political control by increasing participation, by generating and spreading al-
ternative political perspectives, and by encouraging the more widespread development of political
skills. Despite periodic challenges, most notably that from the dependency school (Diamond 1992:
473), the modernization approach dominated work on the relationship between development and
democracy right though to the 1990s.
Two key points about modernization theory are worth noting at this stage. First, it sees causality
as running from development to democracy, and thus far nothing has been said about the reverse
5effect, of democracy on development. In addition, it posits an endogenous relationship between
economic development and political institutions, whereby democracy is the ﬁnal stage in a single,
general process. We will come back to the ﬁrst point in just a moment. With regards to the sec-
ond, this endogenous approach is just one of two possible ways to read Lipset, as Przeworski and
Limongi (1997) piercingly pointed out. Modernization theorists claim that that upon reaching a
certain level of economic development, countries will democratize. However, the alternative ex-
ogenous reading of Lipset’s hypothesis is that economic development has no effect whatsoever on
the likelihood of a country actually becoming democratic, but that given the existence of democ-
racy, economic development increases the probability of its survival.
Importantly, these altogether different claims imply the same positive correlation between eco-
nomic development and democracy, a correlation whose existence is evident from even a cursory
glance at the aggregate data (for which see Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 156). If rich countries
are just as likely to establish democracies as they are dictatorships, but rich democracies are less
likely to collapse than poor ones, then this correlation will be produced by the simple passage of
time. But if economic development does not cause democracy, why should it promote democratic
survival? Przeworski’s answer is that democracy is more likely to survive in rich countries because
there is too much to lose from turning against it.
In poor democracies there is little to distribute, so a group’s income will not be much higher than it
would be under a dictatorship, irrespective of whether that group wins or loses an election. There-
fore in poor democracies a group has little to lose in seeking to overturn democratic institutions in
order to set up a dictatorship with itself at the helm. In rich countries, on the other hand, there is a
large difference between the income of a group that loses democratic elections and that of a group
oppressed by a dictatorship. Therefore even though the returns to a successful anti-democratic
coup may be very large, in rich countries the possibility of failing presents sizable costs, such
that “even permanent electoral losers prefer to obey election results” (Przeworski 2004: 11). As
6a result, when economic development increases in a democracy, so too does the probability of
democratic survival.1
Although this claim is vastly different to that made by the modernization theorists, it does remain
focused on the question of how development affects democracy. Yet this is only one way of think-
ing about the relationship. It is also entirely possible that causality runs in the opposite direction,
and therefore that the observed correlation results from a positive effect of democracy on economic
development. In which case, it is also pertinent to ask why this might be the case. To which the
most popular answer concerns the role of property rights and constraints on government. This ap-
proach is epitomized by Mancur Olson’s argument, that only the formal institutions of democracy
are capable of providing the conditions necessary for long-term, stable economic growth. More
speciﬁcally, Olson claims that an economy can only reap all the potential gains from investment if
the government can commit to uphold individual rights to property and enforce contracts. Dicta-
torships are prevented from doing so by the inevitably limited time horizons that they face. Lasting
democracies, on the other hand, rely on a set of conditions - the rule of law, the existence of an
independent judiciary, a functioning court system, etc. - whose existence also happens to provide
for the individual rights that are necessary for economic development. Therefore long-run eco-
nomic development is only possible in democracies, because it is only these systems that provide
protection of the necessary individual rights (Olson (1993)).
It seems then that there may indeed be good reasons to expect a relationship between political
institutionsandlevelsofeconomicdevelopment. However, whetherthesereasonsarevalidremains
to be seen. Moreover, there are reasons to think that the causal effect of this relationship runs in
both directions, which is problematic. Fortunately for us, a great deal of empirical vigor has been
directed towards assessing this issue, and so it is to this that we now turn.
1In a recent formalization of this relationship, Przeworski has shown that democratic survival depends not only on
economic development, but also on the level of inequality in a country (Przeworski (2005)).
73.2 Evidence
Asnotedabove, therelationshipbetweenincomeanddemocracyhasgarneredanenormousamount
of attention from political scientists, with numerous studies focusing on both: (1) how economic
development affects institutions; and (2) how institutions affect development. Let us start with
the ﬁrst question, on which evidence has shifted opinion back and forth over the years as anal-
yses have grown ever more sophisticated. Recently however, a single, pertinent conclusion has
gained increasing weight: economic development does not cause democracy. In a seminal work
on this matter, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi effectively sounded the death knell for
modernization theory by demonstrating emphatically that democracy does not emerge as a result
of economic development.
Przeworski and Limongi’s careful and rigorous analysis showed that although the probability of a
dictatorship transitioning to democracy does increase as per capita income rises up to the level of
about $6,000, it then decreases beyond this point. Moreover, while a handful of countries ﬁt the
modernization pattern, there is no evidence to suggest that sustained economic development will
lead authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy, and no level of income predicts when such
a transition should occur (Przeworski and Limongi (1997); Przeworski et al. (2000)). By contrast,
there is strong evidence that economic development increases the probability of democratic sur-
vival. Speciﬁcally, democracy has never collapsed in a country with a per capita income higher
than $6,055 - that of Argentina in 1975 (Przeworski 2004: 9). These ﬁndings strongly suggest that
the relationship between income and democracy does not result from one causing the other. Rather,
it seems that economic development has the effect of increasing regime stability, and importantly
even more so for democracies than dictatorships.
The claim that economic development does not cause democracy has not gone unopposed. It has
been argued for example that in more fully speciﬁed models, and in analyses that are extended
8back to cover longer periods of history, economic development does indeed appear to affect the
probability of a transition to democracy (Boix and Stokes (2003); Coppedge (2003)). In addition,
Przeworski et al. have also been criticized for using a dichotomous measure of democracy. Under-
taking the analysis with a continuous measure, Hadenius and Teorell claim that while economic
development does indeed have no effect on political institutions in states “at the bottom of the
democracy ladder”, it has an (increasing) effect among those that are already “semi-democracies”
(Hadenius and Teorell 2005: 102). Similarly, Barro (1999) shows a positive effect of per capita
income on democracy, when the latter is represented by electoral rights or civil liberties.
However, conﬁdence in the results from many of these analyses is weakened by recognition of var-
ious enduring methodological problems. In a more recent reevaluation of the relationship between
income and democracy, Acemoglu et al. argue that previous studies fail to establish any causal
relationship because they suffer from serious omitted variable bias, and because they ignore the
possibility of reverse causality (that democracy may cause income). By employing ﬁxed effects
to control for any country-speciﬁc factors that may simultaneously determine both institutions and
growth they show that there is in fact no relationship between changes in per capita income and
changes in democracy. In addition, using past savings rates and changes in the incomes of trading
partners to instrument for income, they show no evidence for a causal effect of income on democ-
racy. Instead, they suggest that the correlation between income and democracy may be explained
by the fact that countries were set on particular development paths at critical junctures in history,
some of which were conducive to both economic and democratic development (Acemoglu et al.
(2008)). Therefore despite all the attention, it seems fairly safe to conclude at this point in time
that economic development does not cause democracy.
What then does the evidence have to say about the alternative possibility, that democracy causes
economic development? Fortunately for us, this issue has also received a great deal of attention.
One very effective and straightforward approach to the question has been to use a difference-
9in-differences strategy to look at how sudden changes in political regimes affect per capita in-
come. The ﬁrm consensus arising from a number of recent studies that have used this approach
is that transitions to democracy do indeed promote economic growth (Papaioannou and Siourou-
nis (2008); Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005); Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005); Persson and Tabellini
(2006)). In a further methodological advance, Persson and Tabellini (2008) employed a semi-
parametric approach by combining difference-in-differences with matching. Doing so overcomes
the strong indentifying assumptions necessitated by a straightforward difference-in-differences ap-
proach, thereby arguably yielding consistent estimates of the average effect of political regime
changes. As a result of which, they ﬁnd that reverse transitions, from dictatorship to democracy,
lead to a 2% decrease in economic growth, an effect which equates to a 45% loss of per capita
income over a 25 year period (Persson and Tabellini 2008: 26). This useful body of empirical evi-
dence strongly suggests a positive effect of democracy on economic development, the importance
of which should not be understated. Where it falls down however, is in failing to illuminate the
causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. If democracy does in fact have such a positive
effect on growth, how can we explain this effect?
Taking a more nuanced approach to the question of how democracy affects income, a groundbreak-
ing and elegant work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) makes a compelling case for
the causal effect of formal political institutions that limit government. Taking differences in Eu-
ropean settler mortality rates as an exogenous determinant of contemporary political institutions,
they identify large effects of institutions on per capita income. Importantly, and in a nod to Mancur
Olson, their interest is in institutions that provide for property rights and checks on government
power, for which they use the protection against “risk of expropriation” index from Political Risk
Services as a proxy (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001: 1370). These ﬁndings have been
corroborated by numerous other studies, which have put forward further evidence that the political
institutions of limited government cause economic growth (e.g. Easterly and Levine (2003); Dollar
10and Kraay (2003); Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004)).
Inevitably though, these conclusions have been called into question, in part due to the fact that
the measures used to describe political institutions fail to do so adequately, and are in fact more
appropriately seen as outcomes rather than inputs (Glaeser et al. 2004: 273). Moreover, it has been
argued that levels of human capital better predict economic growth than do institutions of limited
government, and that institutional improvement should be seen as a result of economic growth,
rather than the other way round (Glaeser et al. (2004)). As a consequence of this continuing
debate, it is at present unclear whether growth is caused by limiting institutions or by human
capital (or indeed by some other aspect of democracy). Future work should therefore continue to
ask what it is about democracy that promotes economic development. It is also likely that different
varietiesofdemocracyhavedifferentialeffectsondevelopment-forexample, analyseshaveshown
that while presidential systems grow faster, parliamentary democracies spend and liberalize more
(Persson and Tabellini (2006)). Consequently, if we are to fully understand the effect of democracy
on economic development, it may also be useful to differentiate between varieties of democratic
institutions, as well as between different aspects that are common to all democracies.
As well as breaking down democracy, however, it is also important to recognize that there are
multiple channels of economic growth through which the effect of democracy might operate. In a
useful earlier analysis, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) sought to break apart these different channels,
and found that democracy has inconsistent effects. In contrast to the more recent difference-in-
differences studies noted above, Tavares and Wacziarg found the overall effect of democracy on
total economic growth to be moderately negative. More speciﬁcally though, and perhaps more
interestingly, they found that while democracy fosters growth by increasing human capital accu-
mulation and reducing inequality, these positive effects are offset by a reduction in physical capital
investment rates and higher levels of government consumption.
11Taking a similar approach, Przeworski (2004) breaks economic development down into its various
component parts - the share of investment in gross national product, the rates of growth of capi-
tal stock and of labor force, and the rates of growth of total income and per capita income - and
examines the impact of political regimes on each of these. In so doing he ﬁnds that, contrary to
Tavares and Wacziarg, regimes have no effect on investment or capital stock accumulation. This
is not to say that regimes do not matter - while the labor force grows faster under dictatorships,
it is used more effectively in democracies. And while dictatorships are better at exploiting their
capital stock, technological progress is faster in democracies. Thus when the various elements of
economic development are considered separately, democracy has both positive and negative ef-
fects. These ﬁndings highlight important differences in the nature of economic development under
different types of regimes. However, taken together the overall rate of total income growth is no
different in dictatorships than it is in democracies. At ﬁrst glance this aggregate ﬁnding appears
to jar with the claim from more recent studies, that democratic transitions have a positive effect
on economic growth. But this is not the case, because Przeworski highlights a crucial difference
between democratic and dictatorial regimes; signiﬁcantly faster population growth under dictator-
ships means that, despite the two regimes having equivalent levels of total income growth, per
capita incomes grow faster under democracies (Przeworski 2004: 17).
Therefore we have some answers. While economic development may increase the probability of
democratic survival, income does not cause democracy. Rather, democracies promote economic
development. Precisely what it is about democracies that has this effect remains somewhat un-
certain. What is clear though, is that democracy is not a panacea for economic development.
Democracies and dictatorships each beneﬁt different aspects of economic development, such that
total income growth is largely unaffected by political regimes. However, as a result of demo-
graphic differences across regimes, per capita income grows faster under democracy. This fact is
crucial for the political economy of human development, which is concerned with the well-being
12of individuals, not of the economy in which individuals live; from the point of view of individual
well-being, what matters is not the growth of total income but of per capita income (Przeworski
2004: 17). Therefore if we take per capita income as a proxy for living standards, we can conclude
that formal political institutions, and more speciﬁcally democratic political institutions, increase
this aspect of human development. As the 1990 HDR made clear, however, human development is
about more than just income. So, what of its other components?
4 ThePoliticalEconomyofHuman(Human)Development: Knowl-
edge and Longevity
As a proxy for living standards, income is but one aspect of human development - remembering
Sen, human development is concerned more generally with “the richness of human life”. For this
richness to be fully realized requires the enlarging of people’s choices, not just by ensuring that
they have the resources necessary to achieve a decent standard of living, but also by allowing them
to lead long and healthy lives, and to acquire knowledge. Stated more simply, human development
is not just a matter of income, but also of education and health. Just as with the determinants of
income, we are again fortunate that a great deal of scholarly attention has also been directed at the
political economy of these elements of human development. The primary focus of these efforts
has been on the effect of formal political institutions at the macro level (regimes). In addition, a
number of very useful studies have also looked at more informal aspects, such as the nature of
political competition, and factors affecting levels of accountability. Before reviewing the empirical
conclusions of this work, it is again worthwhile to consider the theoretical arguments.
134.1 Theories
Why might democracy affect education and health? The relationship between formal political
institutions and the provision of public goods such as these is one that has been considered at
length, and various explanations have been suggested for why we should expect such a relation-
ship to exist. Following Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), these can be broken down neatly into three
categories, focusing on issues of: (1) representation; (2) accountability; and (3) selection. In an
example of the ﬁrst, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) develop a model whereby autocracy is a dic-
tatorship of the rich and democracy is a dictatorship of the poor or middle classes. As a result,
we might expect greater public goods provision under democracy because the people represented
by those in control of this type of system are likely to have higher preferences for redistribution
and public services. This logic is echoed in part by Vollmer and Ziegler (2009), who argue that
democratic regimes should provide more public goods than dictatorships because they are respon-
sive to the higher redistributive concerns of the decisive median voter, concerns which are taken to
encompass the provision of public goods and services. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand,
have no such incentives to redistribute in response to the needs of their citizens, and therefore
fewer public goods are provided. These arguments are appealing for their intuitive simplicity, but
they fail to adequately account for the dynamics of political competition, and for the incentives of
political actors.
The second category of explanations deals with these issues more completely, by emphasizing the
importance of accountability. From this perspective public goods provision is higher under democ-
racy because elections render politicians accountable to the electorate. As a result, politicians are
required to distribute public goods to a wide segment of the population in order to stay in ofﬁce.
This logic has been most famously and effectively expounded by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2001),
who focus on the size of a regime’s “minimal winning coalition”, the support of which is nec-
essary if leaders are to retain power. This support can be won through the distribution of public
14or private goods. By virtue of their formal political institutions (namely, elections), democracies
have large winning coalitions, whose support is bought much more cheaply with public than with
private goods. And as a consequence, more public goods will be provided under democracy.
The essence of this explanation was foreshadowed by Bates (1984), who recognized that in the
absence of competitive elections, authoritarian regimes in Africa were able to ignore the demands
of the vast rural majority, focusing resources instead on the minority urban interests whose support
was necessary to retain power. In addition, a related argument put forward by Lake and Baum
(2001) also recognizes the importance of political competition, but focuses on the barriers to exit
for politicians and the costs to participation for citizens, rather than simply the size of the coalition
whose support is necessary to stay in power (see also Baum and Lake (2003)). Starting from
the assumptions that all states seek to maximize rents, and that ﬁxed budgets mean that rents are
a function of the public services that are produced, Lake and Baum argue that a state’s ability
to extract rents is constrained by the contestability of the political market. In a democracy, lower
barriers to exit and lower costs to participation make the political market more contestable, thereby
increasing the provision of public services. Again then, what matters from this perspective are the
formal political institutions that lie at the heart of democracy - competitive elections.
Democratic elections make politicians more accountable to the general public. Whether one
pitches it as leaders buying support or as citizens demanding recognition, the outcome is the same:
by virtue of elections, democracy increases the provision of public goods. The strength of this
category of explanations comes from the fact that they are explicit about the incentives of political
actors, and about the institutional structures shaping these incentives. As a result, they are unam-
biguous with regards to what it is about democracy that increases the provision of public goods.
Although the theoretical arguments emphasizing representation may rest implicitly on the effects
of elections, they are not explicit about this fact in the same way. A third category of explanation
that focuses on selection is even less effective in this regard, but is still worth noting. Besley and
15Kudamatsu suggest that democracies have “stronger mechanisms for selecting competent and hon-
est leaders to implement policy” (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006: 314). The implication here is that
democracy will lead not just to more but also to better public service provision than autocracy. Just
as in the ﬁrst two categories of explanation, elections play a key role in this argument. However,
it relies on the assumption that democratically elected leaders are more honest and competent than
their authoritarian counterparts, and whether this is true remains to be seen.
In an interesting reﬁnement on the accountability explanation, Mani and Mukand (2007) have
argued that the incentives for elites to provide public goods varies across types of goods according
to their “visibility”, where visibility refers to the likelihood that elites will gain credit from voters
for the provision of the good. For example, reducing mortality through famine relief is much more
visible than doing so by preventing malnutrition, even if the overall impact on mortality is much
lower. Modeling democracy as a continuum, Mani and Mukand argue that democratization widens
the gap in resource distribution between more and less visible public goods, up to an intermediate
level of democracy, beyond which the gap diminishes. The key point to note is that democratic
political institutions alter incentives to provide different types of public goods, so not all public
goods will be improved by democracy. This important recognition, that the speciﬁc nature of
goods matters, only arises due to the fact that the theory is explicit about the incentives that drive
politicians to provide public goods.
What we have then is a body of theory regarding the effects of formal democratic institutions on the
provision of public goods, the most convincing branch of which argues that democracies provide
more public goods because of the accountability generated by competitive elections. But it is also
possible that accountability is promoted by factors other than formal institutions, which affect the
performance of these institutions. Phil Keefer (2004) recognizes insightfully that imperfections in
political markets can reduce levels of accountability, thereby undermining the positive effects of
democratic institutions. Two possible sources of such imperfections that he highlights are infor-
16mation and credibility. Where citizens lack information about the performance of political elites,
they are unable to hold those elites to account. Likewise credibility, or the extent to which voters
can believe the pre-electoral promises of candidates, is essential if citizens are to hold politicians
responsible for poor performance (Keefer 2004: 265). By modeling the behavior of non-credible
politicians, who can either build up credibility by expending their own resources or employ pa-
trons to act as credible intermediaries, Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) predict that a lack of credibility
will result in corruption, clientelism, and low provision of public goods. Recognizing the impor-
tance of information also brings us back to the insights from Mani and Mukand, because varying
the information environment will affect the visibility of public goods, thereby altering politicians’
incentives to provide them, and preventing the best policies from being realized.
What these arguments highlight is that there are limitations to democracy. Where citizens can
effectively hold politicians accountable for policy, democratic institutions can pave the way for
human development. But this outcome is not guaranteed. In the absence of accountability, the
provision of public goods can be undermined by corruption and clientelism. Formal institutions
alone may not be enough to promote development, if politicians can win elections and maximize
rents by other means. It is therefore important to recognize the incentives created by democratic
institutions, and to consider how best to align these incentives with policies that will best promote
human development.
Thus far we have focused on factors that inﬂuence the provision of public goods, and thus affect
levels of education and health. However, it is also necessary to recognize the possible endogeneity
in this relationship. Speciﬁcally, it has been argued that higher levels of education affect the nature
of political institutions, by increasing the likelihood of democracy. Modeling this relationship,
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007) predict that higher
levels of education increase the likelihood of a democratic transition. Both models are based on
the assumption that education increases the beneﬁts to political participation, which is important
17because democracy requires broad participation by individuals who have weak incentives to do so.
While certainly interesting, it is unclear that the models actually make predictions about the effect
of education because, and Glaeser et al. admit, it applies to any device that increases incentives
to participate (which presumably includes money, and guns). That being said, they highlight an
important question concerning the direction of causality, which must be taken into account when
attempting to investigate the existence of any causal effects.
The most important point to take from this is that not all democracies are created equal. We have
good reason to believe that, because of the accountability afforded by formal (electoral) institu-
tions, democracies will provide more public goods than dictatorships. Added to this, however,
there are also reasons to think that some democracies will provide more public goods than others,
because informal structures can alter the effectiveness of this accountability. And in addition, there
is the ever-present possibility of endogeneity. The necessary question that follows is: what do we
know about the validity of these arguments? The following section reviews results from empirical
investigations of the determinants of public goods provision, and in particular of education and
health.
4.2 Evidence
Although less numerous than studies of income and economic growth, there nevertheless exists
a fairly sizable body of research looking at whether, and how, formal political institutions affect
health, and even more on their relationship with education. Let us consider education ﬁrst.
184.2.1 Education
Although numerous studies have provided evidence for the existence of a relationship between
political institutions and education, the causal direction of this relationship is disputed. A strong
case has been made for the claim that education affects political institutions. Speciﬁcally, the
argument is that higher aggregate levels of education increase the likelihood of a country becoming
and staying democratic. This claim was initially made on the basis of evidence that changes in
years of schooling predict changes in democracy, but not vice-versa (Glaeser et al. (2004); Glaeser,
Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007); Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008)). However, these ﬁndings have
been disputed on the basis that they result simply from a simultaneous increase in both education
and democracy throughout the world over the last 35 years, and that including year dummies and
country ﬁxed effects removes any impact of education on democracy, as well as on other political
institutions (Acemoglu et al. (2005); Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i Martin (2004)). In a methodological
retort though, subsequent studies have argued that more appropriate statistical techniques do in
fact show a causal effect of education on democracy, even when country and temporal effects are
taken into account (Castell´ o-Climent (2008); Bobba and Coviello (2007)). In the midst of these
statistical squabbles it is therefore impossible to say conclusively whether or not education has an
impact on the choice of formal political institutions.
However, it is worth noting at this juncture that education can be conceived of in a variety of
ways, and that the speciﬁc aspect of education that these studies focus on is human capital stock.
All of the analyses cited above use a variable for aggregate educational attainment, taken from
an excellent dataset which contains average years of school completed by each country’s adult
population aged 25 and over, at ﬁve year intervals from 1965 to 1995 (Barro and Lee (2001)).
As such, this data provides an incredibly useful measure of human capital stock at the national
level. This is certainly an important aspect of education, and given the theoretical propositions
is arguably the most relevant conception with regards to the question of whether education affects
19politicalinstitutions. Butinaddressingthecausesofhumandevelopmentitislessuseful, becauseit
is likely to be extremely slow-moving. The immediate effects of institutional change on education,
for example, will be felt by those of school-age, not adults aged 25 and over. Therefore a measure
that aggregates educational attainment for all adults will not reﬂect these effects until those actually
affected reach the age of 25, and even then their impact on the aggregate measure will be swamped
by their elders. This suggests that a more sensitive measure is needed if we are to investigate the
determinants of education effectively.
That being said, the Barro and Lee data has been used to demonstrate a signiﬁcant effect of democ-
racy on educational attainment, even controlling for country ﬁxed-effects (Tavares and Wacziarg
(2001)). But the fact that the measure is so slow-moving means that while this is interesting it is
perhaps not all that useful. Alternative measures of education outputs are literacy and school enrol-
ment rates, and data on both of these is included in the set of World Bank Development Indicators.
Using this data, various analyses have shown a positive and signiﬁcant impact of democracy on en-
rolment, which much better captures the immediate effect of institutional change (Brown (1999);
Lake and Baum (2001); Tsai (2006)). Democracy has also been shown to have a similar effect on
literacy (Lake and Baum (2001); Tsai (2006); Vollmer and Ziegler (2009)).
In addition, studies have used government spending ﬁgures as a measure of educational inputs,
and have shown it to be increased by transitions to democracy (Stasavage (2005); Tsai (2006)). As
is always the case, it is important to recognize that this data is not without ﬂaws, as it relies on
assumptions about the validity and honesty of government-reported ﬁgures. Moreover, an increase
in inputs does not necessarily imply the same for outputs. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence
strongly supports a positive effect of democracy on education, whether it is conceived in terms of
the resources being put in, or the fruits that they produce. One weakness of the empirical work that
investigates the relationship between democracy and education is the exclusive use of macro-level
data. One exception to this is the study by Hecock (2006), who uses data on primary education
20spending across 29 Mexican states between 1999 and 2004 to demonstrate that the competitiveness
of democratic elections also affects education spending, with higher levels of spending in more
competitive areas. A useful next step would be to shift the analysis down even further, to the
individual-level.
4.2.2 Health
A number of studies have also considered the relationship between political institutions and the
third key component of human development - longevity. Again, the vast weight of evidence sup-
ports a positive impact of democracy, and here there is no controversy over the direction of causal-
ity; there is no suggestion that longevity promotes democracy. The UNDP’s human development
index incorporates data on life expectancy at birth as a measure of longevity, and a number of stud-
ies have used this same indicator to show a positive effect of democracy (Lake and Baum (2001);
Franco, Alvarez-Dardet and Ruiz (2004); Besley and Kudamatsu (2006); Tsai (2006); Vollmer and
Ziegler (2009)).
For the most part these studies have taken a fairly straightforward approach to demonstrating the
existence of a positive relationship between a country’s political institutions and the average life
expectancy of its citizens, although some do a better job than others of controlling for time trends
and unobserved country-speciﬁc factors. Democracy has also been shown to have a positive effect
on others indicators of health - compared to dictatorships democracies have lower mortality rates,
and fewer women die in childbirth (Przeworski (2004)). In addition, another popular health indi-
cator is infant mortality, which has been found to be signiﬁcantly lower in democracies (Zweifel
and Navia (2000); Shandra et al. (2004); Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin (2004)). Indeed, Lake
and Baum (2001) ﬁnd that a full transition to democracy reduces infant mortality by ﬁve deaths
per thousand, and Przeworski (2004) ﬁnds that the positive effect of democracy on infant survival
21rates remains after controlling for selection effects. On this evidence then, it would seem that
political institutions do matter for longevity.
Despite such strong support though, Michael Ross rejects this ﬁnding on the basis that many of
these studies have used biased samples, excluding high-performing “nondemocracies” for which
data is unavailable. After statistically imputing these missing observations, Ross ﬁnds that once
these nondemocracies are included, regime type has little or no effect on infant mortality rates.
While he accepts that democracies spend more on healthcare, his claim is that the beneﬁts of this
additional spending bypass the poor, accruing instead to middle- and upper-income groups (Ross
(2006)). However, with the macro-level data that Ross employs it is not possible to disaggregate
between income groups in a way that would enable this claim to be evaluated. Instead what is
required is a shift to micro-level data.
Undertaking just such a shift, Masayuki Kudamatsu uses individual-level data from the Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys to analyze the “within-mother” effect of democratization on infant
mortality across 28 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Kudamatsu (2007)). By comparing the sur-
vival probabilities of infants born to the same mothers before and after a democratic transition,
Kudamatsu is able to identify the effect of institutional change much more precisely. In so do-
ing, he ﬁnds a positive and signiﬁcant effect - infants are more likely to survive under democracy.
A useful next step would be to use this data to investigate whether or not these beneﬁts are felt
differently across income groups, as Ross suggests.
Moving on from mortality rates, a number of scholars have started to get more creative in ﬁnding
different indicators of health. Focusing on the question of how regime type affects the poor, ? use
intriguing data on average daily calorie consumption to investigate whether certain regime types
are better at translating economic growth into consumption for the poorest citizens. With this data
they provide evidence that democracies are better than autocracies at converting economic growth
22into calorie consumption. In addition, Kahn (2005) uses a dataset on annual deaths from disasters
in 73 countries from 1980 to 2002 to provide evidence that democracies suffer less death from
natural disasters than non-democracies do.
As with education then, while there is no consensus with regards to the effect of democracy on
longevity, the weight of evidence suggests that political institutions do matter for health. Certainly,
our knowledge of this relationship would beneﬁt hugely from more work like that by Kudamatsu,
which seeks to identify these effects at a micro-level; focusing on the individuals affected by
institutions is needed if we are to fully understand the causes of human development. On the
whole though, it seems reasonable to conclude that institutions matter; in terms of education and
health as well as income, democracy appears to have a positive effect on human development.
However, as the cautious tone of this conclusion suggests, formal institutions are not a cure-all.
Democracy is not simply good per se, but is good because it provides opportunities. As discussed
above, how to make the most of the opportunities provided by the formal institutions of democracy
is a separate question, to which we turn now.
5 What is it about democracy that matters?
As noted above, the most convincing arguments for why formal democratic institutions are beneﬁ-
cial to human development are those that focus on accountability. In fact, as Tsai (2007) has shown
with regards to China, even in the absence of democracy public goods provision (and thus human
development) can be encouraged by informal accountability structures. Informed by in-depth ﬁeld-
work in 316 rural Chinese villages, Tsai argues that the presence of “solidary groups” increases
the quality of local public goods, because such groups spread information about the performance
of local ofﬁcials. Ofﬁcials are sensitive to this information because it affects their moral standing
in the community, thereby operating as an alternative to electoral incentives. This argument fur-
23ther supports the idea that accountability structures underpin the positive impact of democracy on
human development.
Tsai’s results add further weight to the ﬁndings from previous studies of the relationship between
elections and public goods provision in rural China. Using data from a survey of Chinese villages,
Zhang et al. (2004) and Luo et al. (2007) ﬁnd that elected local leaders tend to shift direct tax
burdens from households to enterprises when they are available, resulting in an increase in the
provision of local public goods. Moreover, the role of information in Tsai’s argument echoes
Keefer’s claim, that the beneﬁts of accountability afforded by formal democratic institutions may
be affected by other factors, and in particular by information and credibility. If this is true, we
are faced with further empirical questions: do these factors affect accountability, and does this in
turn affect human development? Fortunately, these questions have been addressed by a number of
theoretical and empirical studies.
In a purely theoretical work, Majumdar, Mani and Mukand (2004) develop a model of public
spendingallocation, inwhichaccesstoinformationvariesacrossdifferentgroupsofvoters, thereby
affecting their ability to evaluate the government’s performance. As a result, they predict that more
informed groups of voters will receive higher allocations of public spending. Similarly, Besley and
Burgess (2002) model the retrospective voting decisions of imperfectly informed citizens to show
how varying the level of media activism alters the incumbent’s re-election chances, and thus affects
how much effort the incumbent exerts. In an empirical test of this claim - that information from
the media improves government responsiveness by increasing accountability - they show that state
governments in India react more effectively to falls in food production and crop ﬂood damage
via public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure in areas where newspaper circulation
is higher. As a result, they claim that for the potential beneﬁts of formal democratic institutions
to be realized “requires effective institutions for information transmission to voters” (Besley and
Burgess 2002: 1446).
24Analyses of public spending patterns in the US have also demonstrated the effect of information
providedbythemedia. Thenumberofradiolistenersinacountysigniﬁcantlyincreasedtheamount
of relief funds received under the New Deal, and federal spending is signiﬁcantly lower in areas
where there is less press coverage of the local members of congress (Stromberg (2004); Snyder Jr
and Stromberg (2008)). In addition, further empirical support for the role of information in ac-
countability has been provided by Ferraz and Finan (2008), who show that the disclosure of local
government corruption in Brazil signiﬁcantly alters the re-election success of incumbent mayors.
Moreover, there is also strong evidence that in improving accountability, information has a positive
impact on human development. Chowdhury (2004) ﬁnds that corruption is signiﬁcantly lower in
countries with more press freedom. If we take corruption to be a function of public services (see
Lake and Baum (2001)), a reduction in corrupt practices should correspond to an increase in public
service provision, with subsequent beneﬁts to human development.
Adopting a micro-level approach to the question, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) have also shown
that access to information can reduce rents. Using proximity to newspaper outlets as a measure of
information in Uganda, they show that head teachers in schools closer to a newspaper outlet are
more knowledgeable of the rules governing grant programs and the timing of releases of funds by
the central government, enabling them to claim a signiﬁcantly larger part of the funds to which
they were entitled. In addition, they show that a newspaper campaign providing parents with infor-
mation to monitor local ofﬁcials’ handling of a large education grant program signiﬁcantly reduced
the capture of funds by local government ofﬁcials. As well as demonstrating the power of infor-
mation to reduce corruption, however, they also show that the reduction in capture had a positive
effect on human development, by increasing school enrollment and student test scores. Informa-
tion has also been found to have a positive impact on healthcare. Following a randomized ﬁeld
experiment in Uganda, Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) show that providing citizens with informa-
tion about the quality of public service provision increases their ability to hold local government
25agents accountable, thereby improving the quality of local health services - their results show that
information leads to signiﬁcant reductions in child mortality and increases in child weight. This re-
inforces and builds upon the ﬁnding by Wantchekon and Vermeersch (2009), that media exposure
increases citizens’ demand for public goods.
Although the literature is admittedly limited, there is thus some evidence that access to informa-
tion does indeed increase accountability, and that this in turn is beneﬁcial to human development.
Furthermore, Keefer (2007) has shown that younger democracies, which are assumed to be less
credible, provide fewer public goods than older, more established democratic systems. This sug-
gests that credibility might also matter for realizing the potential beneﬁts of democracy. Although
measuring credibility is admittedly much harder than measuring information, future work on this
subject would be incredibly useful. What the work discussed above also suggests is the importance
of participation. Not only is information crucial in enabling individuals to participate in holding
politicians and ofﬁcials to account, but higher levels of political participation have been found
to increase public goods provision, and thus encourage human development (Besley and Burgess
(2002); Chowdhury (2004)). In a related work, Avritzer (2009) argues that the development of par-
ticipatory institutions in Brazil has led to greater redistribution of public goods. Therefore given
the potential for participation to improve human development, this would also appear to be fertile
ground for future research.
6 Conclusions
Human development is about giving people choices. It is about allowing them to lead long and
healthy lives, to acquire knowledge, and to gain access to the resources necessary for a decent
standard of living. And even more than that, it is about enabling them to make use of these ca-
pabilities to improve the quality of their lives. Income is certainly part of this, but education and
26health are also vital. Moreover, as Gray and Purser (2010) have shown, these three elements of
human development are quite clearly distinct. With this recognition in mind, in this paper we have
sought to summarize what we know about the causes and consequences of human development.
Having done so, we offer the following conclusions.
Political institutions matter. Speciﬁcally, human development is higher under democracy. Al-
though total economic growth is no faster in democracies, democracy has a positive impact on per
capita income, which is what matters for human development. And importantly, democracy is not
itself caused by economic growth; although democracy is more likely to survive in rich countries
than in poor ones, there is no evidence that it is more likely to be conceived in these conditions.
Democratic political institutions also have a positive effect on education and health, and again there
is no conclusive evidence that democracy is endogenous. Whether measured as enrolment rates,
literacy levels, or government spending, as life expectancy, infant mortality, or childbirth survival,
democracy is good for human development.
Political institutions matter because they provide structures of accountability. The most convinc-
ing explanations for why democracy beneﬁts human development focus on the ability of citizens
to hold politicians to account through competitive elections. These institutions thus generate in-
centives for politicians to broaden the provision of public goods, thereby increasing education,
health, and living standards. That informal accountability structures in nondemocratic China also
have a positive impact on public goods lends further weight to the claim that what matters about
democracy is accountability.
Political institutions provide the opportunities for development, but these opportunities can be
missed. Politicians can react to electoral incentives by engaging in clientelism, providing private
rather than public goods, or by pursuing policies to further their own interests rather than maximize
human development. While democratic elections provide structures of accountability that can
27avoid this, the extent to which this accountability is realized depends on other factors. For example,
citizens need information about the performance of politicians and ofﬁcials if these individuals
are to be held accountable. Where such information is available, we see higher levels of human
development. Information also facilitates participation, which itself has a positive effect on human
development.
These conclusions are important, but they are only a starting point. We need to continue inves-
tigating the causes and consequences of human development, in order that we can learn how to
maximize the positive potential of democracy. Do some types of democratic institutions provide
more accountability than others? What factors have the biggest impact on accountability? If in-
formation matters, when and where does it matter most? And, what kind of information is most
effective? Likewise, if participation matters do some forms of participation have more positive
effects than others? And as has been suggested, does credibility matter? These are just a few
of the questions that need to be asked if we are to fully understand the determinants of human
development.
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